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ABSTRACT 
Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing 
interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection 
work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically 
examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment 
plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable 
properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help 
formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs 
for the "Option 4" safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants ['I. The features of 
"Option 4" safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, 
along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of 
Moran's "Option 4" are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at 
the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant 
diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video 
monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can 
help to detect unidentified cylinders. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The technology of Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs) recently has advanced 
rapidly such that various industries are adopting it to improve the efficiency of their operations, 
notably in tracking merchandise and managing inventory. RFIDs are systems that wirelessly 
transmit via radio waves the identity of and associated information about objectslmerchandise to 
detection devices. Since RFIDs can be automatically scanned and connected to data-managing 
systems (computers and internet), they afford a wide variety of opportunities to track and manage 
objects very efficiently and quickly. One of their most visible and successfid applications is in 
highway toll systems, such as New York State's E-ZPass. 
The value of RFIDs has also been frequently mentioned in the context of helping to improve 
safeguards measures at advanced gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). For example, 
RFIDs could potentially help reduce the number of inspections, the number of samples collected, 
and the duration of visits while also improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a safeguards 
approach. In his study for the U.S. NRC ['I, Bruce Moran evaluated various options to guide the 
selection of an IAEA safeguards approach for large GCEPs. One of his options (Option 4) 
included tagging cylinders with RFIDs. 
This study systematically examines in detail the application of RFIDs in Moran's Option 4 and 
assesses their performance in improving safeguards at GCEPs. It includes a formal analysis of 
relevant diversion paths in such an enrichment plant. This analysis is the first step to eventually 
identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, provide insights into which 
vulnerabilities are critical, and help to formulate the assurance tests needed. 
2. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS PRACTICES AT GCEPs 
The following are the three principal safeguards concerns at gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment 
facilities declared for the production of low-enriched uranium (LEU, with <20% U-235): 
1. The production and diversion of a significant quantity of uranium with enrichment greater 
than declared (in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU) with 220% U-235), 
2. The diversion of a significant quantity of declared uranium (particularly in the form of the 
LEU product), and 
3. The production of LEU in excess of declared amounts (e.g., using undeclared feed). 
In 1980, the centrifuge-technology holders and the international inspectorates (i.e., Euratom and 
the IAEA) initiated the Hexapartite Safeguards Project WSP) to agree upon an international 
safeguards approach for GCEPs. After 2-112 years of intensive study, they reached an agreement 
applicable to INFCIRCl153-type agreements [*I. This approach includes inspections outside the 
cascade halls (primarily to detect diversion by verifying declared nuclear-material flows and 
inventories) and inside the cascade halls (primarily to detect the production of HEU). 
The activities to be performed by the Agency and Euratom outside the cascade halls to verify the 
declared nuclear-material balance were based on traditional techniques, including the 
examination of records and reports; gross-, partial-, and bias-defect-veri fication measurements of 
relevant nuclear materials; and application of containment and surveillance techniques to 
maintain the continuity of knowledge. The HSP also agreed that provisions should be made to 
give the Agency the opportunity to verify the feed, product, and tails before they are fed to or 
shipped fkom the plant. The HSP declared that the mode of inspections would be intermittent. 
The HSP's conclusions have been the basis for IAEA safeguards at GCEPs since 1983. 
However, the HSP did not address the possibility of undeclared feed. Therefore, the current 
IAEA safeguards approach at GCEPs does not include any specific measures for detecting 
undeclared feed or the undeclared product and tails that might be generated fiom it. It was not 
until the April 2005 meeting, "Techniques for IAEA Verification of Enrichment Activities" that 
the Agency considered in earnest the issue of timely detection of excess production of LEU from 
undeclared feed and consequent deterrence by risk of early detection. Their latest draft 
safeguards approach offers possible solutions to this problem. Brookhaven National Laboratory 
(BNL) contributed to this work by proposing the use of an enhanced "Mailbox" approach 
combined with video surveillance and short-notice random inspections (SNRIs). BNL7s Gordon 
and Sanborn first introduced the MailbodSNRI concept in 1984 as a potential IAEA safeguards 
application at the Portsmouth Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plant ['I 
Over the last two decades, Mailbox declarations have been used to verify the receipts, production, 
and shipments at some bulk-handling facilities (e.g., fuel-fabrication plants) [41. Each day, the 
operator declares to the IAEA the status of the plant, including the final accountability values for 
feed, product, and tails cylinders using a secure Mailbox system such as a secure tamper-resistant 
computer. The operator also consents to hold the cylinders for an agreed period of time (called 
the "residence time"), after which the cylinders can be fed into the process or shipped. The IAEA 
verifies these declared values during short-notice random inspections using the current traditional 
verification methods of weighing, gamma-ray non-destructive analysis (NDA), and sampling for 
destructive analysis (DA). 
3. MODEL PLANT AND MORAN APPROACH OPTIONS 
Moran describes a model plant and safeguards options in his paper, "An Evaluation of Safeguards 
Approach Options for Large Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plants7' ['I. The full capacity of 
the model plant is 3,000 metric tons of separative work units per year (MT SWUIyr). The plant 
consists of six independent cascade hall assay units, each with a capacity of 500 MT SWUIyr. 
The cascade halls encompass cascade enclosures within which the centrihges are located. All six 
units share a Shipping and Receiving Building (SRB) and a Cylinder Accountability Area (CAA) 
with material-accountability scales located in the SRB for cylinders off-loaded from trucks, and 
also in the CAA for cylinders exiting the UF6 Handling Areas. The model assumes that no valves 
or gas-sampling points are sited within the cascade enclosures but rather, are located in technical 
services corridors between them. 
Moran considered four safeguards-approach options with various measures, each of which builds 
on the preceding option. His Option 4 included cylinder tagging that should, at a minimum, 
afford the same assurance of an item's identification as the current markings on the UF6 
cylinders. He assumed usage of passive electronic identification tags that can be read only from 
within a distance of one meter; the interrogation units would be installed inside the feed and 
withdrawal stations. This is equivalent to using a short-range passive WID tag. 
The following safeguards features are included in Option 4: 
Operator's Mailbox declarations of material-accounting data and operational data on the 
cylinder's movements, 
Short-Notice Random Inspections to verify the specified quantities, 
Load-cell monitoring of Feed, Product, and Tails (FIPIT) Stations, 
Accountability-scale monitoring (assuming the scales have electronic outputs that the IAEA 
can authenticate), 
Continuous enrichment monitors (CEMO) at feed, product, and tails headers, and 
WIDs placed on all F, P, and T cylinders with readers in all F/P/T Stations and at the 
accountability scales. 
4, SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS OF wms IN MORAN'S OPTION 4: AN 
EVALUATION 
This study examines the diversion paths at large GCEPs and evaluates whether RFIDs improve 
the effectiveness andlor efficiency of IAEA safeguards in verifying the declared nuclear-material 
balance and in detecting the production of excess product from undeclared feed. 
4.1 Assumptions 
In evaluating the usefulness of RFIDs, there are many outstanding questions about their 
vulnerabilities, the operator's procedures, and the capabilities of the instruments involved. Some 
of the assumptions made for this study are discussed below. 
4.1.a Characteristics of RFIDs and Load-Cell-Based Weighing Systems 
There are outstanding questions about the likelihood of defeat of RFIDs, the ability of 
RFIDsIreaders to withstand the environmental conditions to which they will be exposed, and their 
acceptability by the plant's operator. In addition, there are questions concerning the capabilities 
of the load-cell-based weighing systems (LCBWS): 
How well can the LCBWS measure the feed, product, and tails weights in the FP/T 
stations? (i.e., how much diversion is possible within the measurement errors?) 
How well will the LCBWS hold up under operational conditions? 
This study does not address these questions, but assumes that they can be answered satisfactorily. 
Additionally, this study assumes that the RFIDs will be short-range passive tags with a read-only 
number supplied by the IAEA at time of manufacture. The operator can read the read-only 
number and will assign a corresponding cylinder ID number to that number; this association will 
be declared in the Mailbox. 
Since the IAEA may inspect the plant infrequently and irregularly, it is assumed that the operator 
applies the RFIDs to the cylinders. 
Feed cylinder: The operator applies the RFID to the full feed cylinder when it arrives at 
the plant. 
Customer product 30B cylinder: The operator applies the RFID to the 30B cylinder when 
the empty cylinder arrives at the plant. 
Interim product cylinder: The operator applies the RFID to the in-house interim product 
cylinders at the onset of the M A  safeguards. 
Tails cylinder: The operator has previously applied the RFID to the incoming feed 
cylinder. Following Moran, this study assumes that empty feed cylinders are used as tails 
cylinders. 
4.1.b Capability of the Continuous Enrichment Monitor (CEMO) System 
Whether CEMO can be used for partial-defects test or gross-defects test of assay depends on the 
uncertainty of the instrument for each application. Since the precise accuracy of the uncertainty is 
not needed for this determination, the following assumptions were made regarding its uncertainty. 
It is assumed that the CEMO on product headers can provide a partial-defects test of assay 
(expected - 5-12% relative standard deviation (RSD)). 
It is assumed that the CEMO on feed and tails headers affords only a gross-defects test of 
assay (- 25-50% RSD). 
4.1 .c Cylinder Handling 
Six hundred and ninety (690) full feed cylinders are received, weighed, stored, and fed out each 
year: 625 of them are used for tails withdrawal, and 65 are returned to the feed supplier. 
The Customer product 30B cylinders are received, accountability-weighed, stored, filled at the 
blending facility or directly from the cascades, accountability-weighed, stored, homogenized and 
sampled, accountability-weighed, stored, and shipped. 
Some interim 48Y cylinders are used for product withdrawal and their contents are transferred to 
30B cylinders at the blending facility. Interim cylinders are accountability-weighed, stored, 
filled, accountability-weighed, stored, some or all of their contents transferred at the blending 
facility, accountability-weighed, and stored. The level of enrichment of the UF6 in these 
cylinders is based on estimated (process) values, not on homogenization and sampling results. 
All tails cylinders are emptied 48Y feed cylinders. They are accountability-weighed, stored, 
filled with tails, accountability-weighed, and then stored. The level of enrichment in these tails 
cylinders is based on estimated (process) values, not on homogenization and sampling results. 
4.2 Evaluation 
Various diversion scenarios are analyzed in detail in this section to evaluate whether RFIDs 
improve the effectiveness and/or efficiency of IAEA safeguards in verifying the declared nuclear- 
material balance and in detecting the production of excess product from undeclared feed for the 
"Option 4" safeguards approach. 
Since accountability scales and load cells at the F/P/T Stations are monitored, their readings are 
declared at the Mailbox, and RFIDs readers are placed at all three Stations and at the 
accountability scales, it is assured that undeclared feeds and withdrawals cannot be made there. 
However, it is unclear whether undeclared feeds and withdrawals in the Process Services Area 
and the UF6 Handling Area away from the FIPIT Stations are detectable. This should be verified 
subsequently by Design Information Verification @IV) and Containment and Surveillance (US) 
measures when these measures are established at an actual GCEP. Therefore, the first evaluation 
is based on the assumption that the DIV and C/S cannot assure the detection of undeclared feeds 
and withdrawals in the Process Services Area and the UF6 Handling Area away from F/P/T 
Stations. The second evaluation considers the case when the DIV and C/S can assure the 
detection of undeclared feeds and withdrawals in the Process Services Area and the UF6 Handling 
Area away from F/P/T Stations. 
4.2.1 The DIV and CIS cannot assure the detection of undeclared feeds and withdrawals in 
the Process Services Area and the m6 Handling Area away from F/P/T Stations 
In this section, verification of assays and weights of the feed, product and tails is examined to 
evaluate whether RFIDs can help in detecting diversion of UF6 from the declared and undeclared 
feed for the cases where the DIV and CIS cannot assure the detection of undeclared feeds and 
withdrawals in the Process Services Area and the UF6 Handling Area away from F/P/T Stations. 
A special diversion scenario where operator attempts to transfer an RFID from a declared 
cylinder to undeclared one is also examined to assess whether RFIDs can prevent this scenario. 
4.2.1.a Verification of the Declared Material Balance 
The operator can attempt to divert materials from the declared streams or can produce excess 
amounts of the product by lowering the tails assay. The excess product would be withdrawn in 
the two areas noted above, and the missing mass of tails would be made up by introducing natural 
uranium into the tails withdrawal line. Detecting the latter possibility requires, at a minimum, 
measurements of the tails assay. In addition, the operator can understate both the product assay 
and the tails assay to generate excess quantities of LEU. Consequently, the IAEA must verify 
the U-235 balance (i-e., the feed and product assays, as well as the tails assays.) However, there 
are some scenarios not detectable by RFIDs, LCBWSs, and Mailbox declarations; this case is 
discussed in Section 4.2.1 .b, below. 
Declared Feed Assays 
Due to the assumption that the CEMO can provide only a gross-defects test of the feed assay, 
IAEA inspectors must visit the plant frequently enough to perform NDA partial-defects tests 
and sampling/DA on feed cylinders to achieve the 50% detection probability, which is the 
IAEA's target value. During these visits, relevant cylinders are declared by the operator in the 
Mailbox and in the Interim Inventory List (IIL) at the time of the inspection. The inspector 
then identifies the cylinders in the field by their cylinder numbers. The CEMO results for the 
feed assay are not available at this point, since it is not measured yet. Therefore, the RFlD 
does not improve efficiency in these assay verifications. 
Declared Product Assays 
It was assumed that the CEMO can provide a partial-defects test of product assay. RFIDs 
allow the results from the CEMO test to be associated with specific cylinders. However, to 
accomplish the needed samplinglDA on product cylinders, the IAEA's inspectors must visit 
the plant often enough to reach a 50% probability for detecting a defect. The operator declares 
relevant cylinders in the Mailbox and in the IIL at the time of the inspection, and the inspector 
identifies the cylinders in the field by their cylinder numbers. Here, RFIDs do not improve the 
effectiveness of the safeguards, since the inspectors still make same number of visits and 
inspect same number of cylinders regardless of RFIDs. However, the RFID improves the 
efficiency of assay verification by reducing or eliminating the need for an NDA measurement 
of the cylinder in the field. 
Declared Tail Assays 
It was assumed that the CEMO can provide only a gross-defects test of tails assay. The use of 
RFIDs permits the association of gross-defect CEMO results with specific cylinders. In this 
case, the M A  still must carry out NDA partial-defects tests on these cylinders, but does not 
need as many additional NDA measurements as in the case without RFDs because they have 
the findings from the gross-defect tests (i.e. CEMO results). To do an NDA partial-defects 
test and sampling/DA on tails cylinders, the frequency of the IAEA's inspections must be 
adequate to achieve a 50% detection probability. However, since the tails cylinders reside at 
the facility for long periods of time, there is not an urgency to conduct more frequent 
inspection. The operator declares the relevant cylinders in the Mailbox and in the ILL at the 
time of the inspection, after which the inspector identifies the cylinders in the field by their 
cylinder numbers. RFIDs do not improve the effectiveness of the safeguards, since the 
inspectors still make same number of visits and inspect same number of cylinders 
. regardless of RFIDs. However, the RFID improves the efficiency of assay verification by 
reducing the required number of field measurements of NDA partial-defects. 
Declared Weights for FPIT 
The LCBWS on the FP/T Stations register the weights of UF6 cylinders transferred to and 
from the cascade, noting the gross-full and gross-empty weights of the cylinders involved. 
The LCBWS values, along with the corresponding values from the accountability scales, 
confirm the weights entered by the operator in the Mailbox. The weights of empty tails 
cylinders must agree with those fiom the empty feed-cylinders (accountability and otherwise), 
since the latter are re-used and tracked by the attached RFIDs. Consequently, the IAEA need 
not routinely verify the weights of full and empty feed cylinders, but should randomly verify 
some as a check on the accountability scales and the LCBWS. The RFIDs provide the means 
to verify the cylinder weights that are declared in the Mailbox. This provides depth to the 
safeguards approach and thereby complicates any diversion strategies by the operator since all 
weights must be consistent. Therefore, WIDs improve safeguards effectiveness in this case 
due to increased ability to verifL operator statements and consequent deterrence. 
4.2.1.b Scenarios not detectable by RFID, LCBWS, and Mailbox declarations - detection 
requires additional measures 
Diversion of Product in a 30B cylinder filled directly fiom the cascade 
Under this diversion scenario, after receiving a declared 30B cylinder, the operator affixes the 
RFID to the cylinder and weighs the cylinder on the accountability scale. The operator then 
removes the RFID from the declared cylinder and affixes it on to an undeclared 30B cylinder 
whose weight has been adjusted to reasonably match the declared accountability weight. The 
operator then loads the undeclared cylinder into a product withdrawal (PW) station, and 
withdraws product into it for removal from site. The reader reads the RFID tag, the LCBWS 
records the weights, and the operator makes an entry in the Mailbox. After completing this 
operation and carefully weighing the undeclared cylinder on an undeclared scale, the operator 
removes the RFID tag from the undeclared cylinder and affixes it to the declared cylinder. 
The operator transports the declared cylinder to a concealed location, fills it with the correct 
weight of steel shot, moves it to the accountability scale, weighs it, and then places it in the 
storage yard. This cylinder is never shipped offsite. The operator could fill more product on 
to the steel shot, and it would not be detected by traditional NDA and DA measures. The 
falsification could be detected by gamma NDA andlor ultrasonic measurements through the 
bottom of the cylinder; but RFIDs do not aid in the detection of this diversion. 
Diversion of Product in a 48Y interim product cylinder filled fiom the cascade 
All 48Y interim product cylinders should have an RFID permanently attached to them at the 
beginning of safeguards implementation. However, in this scenario, the operator claims to 
have acquired a new 48Y cylinder for product transfers. Given this, the operator affixes a new 
RFID to an undeclared 48Y cylinder and loads it into the PW station. The reader reads the 
WID tag, the LCBWS records the weights, and the operator makes an entry in the Mailbox. 
Next, the operator withdraws some product into the undeclared cylinder for removal fiom the 
site. After carefully weighing the undeclared cylinder, the operator removes the WID tag 
from the undeclared cylinder and affixes it to the newly declared cylinder. The operator fills 
the declared cylinder with the correct weight of steel shot at a concealed location, moves it to 
the accountability scale, weighs it, and then leaves it briefly in the storage yard. Later, the 
declared cylinder, with its RFID tag, is moved to a PW station, and UF6 is added on to the 
steel shot. Then, the cylinder is transported to the accountability scale, weighed, and placed in 
the storage yard. . The operator may never withdraw UF6 from this cylinder, or may 
withdraw some material from it for blending operations. Traditional NDA and DA do not 
catch this falsification. Again, the deception can be detected by gamma NDA andor 
ultrasonic measurements through the bottom of the cylinder, but RFIDs do not help. 
Diversion of Tails in a 48Y cylinder filled from the cascade 
If an operator claims that new 48Y cylinders were purchased for tails withdrawal, then the 
same type of diversion strategy described above for product can be performed. However, the 
diversion of tails is less important for safeguards than the diversion of product. 
4.2.l.c Detection of Undeclared Product Produced from Undeclared Feed 
Diversion of Undeclared F, P, and T using the declared FP/T Stations 
In this scenario, the operator introduces and removes undeclared F, P and T using the declared 
FPIT Stations. RFID readers are located at every FPIT Station. Therefore, it would be an 
anomaly if an undeclared cylinder with no WID shows up in one of the FP/T stations. This 
anomaly is only compounded when the LCBWS indicates the occurrence of feeding or 
withdrawing of material when no RFID is present. The recording of feed or withdrawals by 
the LCBWS without an attendant entry in the Mailbox is also an anomaly. While, the absence 
of an WID confirms the anomalies observed in this scenario, it is unnecessary for its detection 
(i.e., the lack of a Mailbox entry suffices). Therefore, the effectiveness of safeguards is not 
enhanced by RFIDs in this scenario. 
Diversion of Undeclared F, P, and T using Process Services and/or UF6 Handling Areas away 
fiom declared F/P/T Stations 
In this scenario, the operator introduces and removes undeclared F, P, and T using equipment 
in the Process Services Area and/or the UF6 Handling Area away fiom the declared FffE 
Stations. These operations most likely would be carried out with undeclared cylinders smaller 
than the declared 30B and 48Y cylinders. RFIDs would not be placed on the undeclared 
cylinders and declared cylinders with RFIDs attached would not be used for undeclared 
operations. Hence, RFIDs do not help in detecting feed and withdrawals at these locations. 
4.2.2 The DIV and CIS can assure the detection of undeclared feeds and withdrawals in the 
Process Services Area and the UF6 Handling Area away from PIPIT Stations 
4.2.2.a Verification of the Declared Material Balance 
The operator can attempt to divert materials from the declared streams or produce excess amounts 
of product by lowering the product and/or tails assays. 
Excess product made by lowering the tails and/or product assays must be withdrawn somewhere 
along the piping. It is assumed that the D N  can assure that this removal cannot occur inside the 
cascade area (i.e., there are no valves or ports inside the area). It also is assumed that the DIV 
and CIS can assure that attempted withdrawals in the Process Services Area and the UF6 
Handling Area away from the FP/T Stations are detected. Thus, the only remaining place where 
excess product could be taken is from a declared PW station. The following analysis 
demonstrates that this action will be detected. 
Excess product can be made by lowering the tails assay; however, the amount of tails withdrawn 
would be too small, and equal to the weight of excess LEU produced. If the product assay also is 
reduced along with the tails assay, then the tails deficit is even larger. The deficit might be made 
up by introducing feed or tails into the piping in the Process Services Area of the m6 handling 
Area away from the F/P/T Stations. But, this evaluation assumes that the D N  and C/S assure 
the detection of an attempted introduction of materials in these areas, and that, likewise, it cannot 
be introduced in the cascade area.. Accordingly, the tails deficit cannot be made up without 
detection. Hence, a uranium- or weight-balance (verified by the LCBWS) is sufficient to verify 
the material balance. 
The LCBWS values, along with the corresponding values from the accountability scales, confirm 
the feed, product, and tails cylinder weights entered by the operator in the Mailbox. Therefore, 
the M A  need not routinely verify the weights of full and empty cylinders. The Agency should 
randomly verify some of them as a check on the accountability scales and the LCBWS. The 
RFIDs offer a continuing association between specific cylinder weights measured by the LCBWS 
and the accountability scales, and the declarations in the Mailbox. Accordingly, the RFID 
information is redundant with the Mailbox declarations and LCBWS results, but does afford 
confirmatory information, thereby complicating the operator's diversion strateges, since all 
weights must be consistent. Thus, the RFIDs marginally improve the effectiveness of safeguards 
due to deterrence. 
4.2.2.b Scenarios not detected by RFID, LCBWS, and Mailbox declarations - detection 
requires additional measures 
The scenarios are the same as those described in 4.2.1 .b: diversion of product in a 30B cylinder 
filled directly from the cascade; diversion of product in a 48Y interim product cylinder filled 
from the cascade; and, diversion of tails in a 48Y cylinder filled from the cascade. As in those 
cases, the falsification can be detected by gamma NDA andlor ultrasonic measurements through 
the bottom of the cylinder; RFIDs do not help in this detection. 
4.2.2.c Detection of Undeclared Product Produced from Undeclared Feed 
For a scenario wherein the operator introduces and removes undeclared F, P, and T using the 
declared FPIT Stations, the conditions/outcomes are the same as described in 4.2.1 .c, above. 
While the absence of an RFID on a cylinder indicates there is an anomaly, the RFID is not 
necessary to detect this (i.e., the lack of a Mailbox entry suffices). The use of the declared F, P, 
and T stations for undeclared feed and withdrawal operations is detected by the LCBWS and 
Mailbox results, and does not depend on the RFID. But RFIDs do provide depth to the safeguards 
approach and therefore would make diversion without detection more difficult and provide deterrence. 
The scenario in which the operator introduces and removes undeclared F, P, and T using 
equipment in the Process Services Area and/or the UF6 Handling Area away from the declared 
F/P/T Stations also will be detected since it is assumed that the DIV and CIS assure the detection 
of undeclared feeds or withdrawals made in these areas. 
5. USE OF RFIDs IN THE PERIMETER MONITORING 
All of the diversion scenarios at a GCEP involve introducing or handling cylinders at some point 
of the process. Therefore, two important steps to greatly increase the success of safeguards are 
(1) to identify all cylinders moving into and out of the separation buildings that house the UF6 
handling areas, process service areas, and cascade halls, and (2) to uncover the presence of 
unidentified cylinders. 
The primary function of RFIDs in safeguards is to quickly and remotely identify cylinders that 
have already been tagged. However, while rapid, remote identification would be helpful for 
handling the cylinders (i.e., for inventory), simple identification of tagged cylinders is not 
sufficient for safeguards purposes. The main weakness is in the inability to notice 
unidentifiedluntagged cylinders that can be used to divert uranium. However, using RFIDs in 
conjunction with a video monitoring system and neutron monitoring system in the separation 
buildings, including their perimeters, would afford a means to better identify unknown (untagged) 
cylinders. 
A system consisting of an RFID reader, video camera, and neutron monitor could be installed at 
all load-cells (feed, product, and tail), sample stations, and all functioning openings at the 
perimeter of the separation buildings except emergency exits. Future studies could designate the 
exact locations of the openings where these monitors should be installed. Operators would tag 
cylinders and attach seals at load cells and accountability scales in front of the monitoring 
cameras (procedures would be developed on how to do this effectively and with minimum 
interruption to the plant's operation); the readings of the load cells and accountability scales could 
be used as Mailbox declarations. This system would be able to detect any cylinders moving 
through the openings (mainly by neutron detection) both into and out of the separation buildings. 
If the cylinder is already tagged, the RFID reader will record the location and the cylinder 
identification. If it is an unidentified cylinder, it will trigger an alarm to a remote 
monitoring system (such as an IAEA central station) and prompt attention from 
inspectors. At the emergency exit doors, the system would be connected to any open-alarm 
trigger. Normally, these doors remain closed. However, the video monitoring system would 
capture any actions at the doors once the door is open and an alarm is triggered. 
Once RFIDs are successfully deployed to account for all the cylinders and their movements into 
and out of the separation buildings, relatively simple procedures can be instituted to ensure that 
their contents are unaltered at any points of handling, using video monitoring and seals connected 
to the RFID. Any subsequent intemptiodbreakage of the seals also will be recorded in the RFlD 
and monitoring video system. Nevertheless, it may still be necessary to undertake conventional 
inspections for NDA and DA tests to ensure the assay of contents. 
Of the three concerns discussed above, the RFID would be least helpful in detecting HEU 
production since it mostly involves the reconfiguration and interconnection of cascades, and its 
detection primarily depends on visually observing the cascade area along with environmental 
sampling. However, HEU production also includes using some cylinders for feed and withdrawal 
at some points in the separation buildings. Therefore, detection of untagged cylinders at the 
periphery of separation buildings also will help in uncovering HEU production. 
6. SUMMARY 
The application of WlDs for the "Option 4" safeguard approach proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. 
NRC, at large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants was analyzed to assess WID 
effectiveness and efficiency for IAEA safeguards. "Option 4" features include RFIDs placed on 
all feed, product, and tails cylinders along with RFID readers in all FIPIT stations and 
accountability scales, in addition to other features (e.g., Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load- 
cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and CEMO). The 
relevant diversion paths were analyzed and the extent to which RFIDs improve efficiency and 
effectiveness was assessed. In general, RFIDs improve efficiency of safeguards substantially. The 
use of RFDs also provides depth to the safeguards approach and complicates diversion strategy. 
Therefore, RFDs slightly improve safeguards effectiveness in general due to increased ability to 
verify activities and consequent deterrence. This study also addresses the use of RFIDs in 
conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach at a 
GCEP to show that this approach may help to detect unidentified cylinders. 
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